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1. Introduction 
Horizontal Mergers between large firms have long attracted governmental attention 
(Farrell and Shapiro, 1990). In the mid-1990s, the regulatory authorities at the U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ), as well as many 
economists, developed a new approach for exploring the potential competitive effects of 
a horizontal merger. This method is known as Horizontal Merger Simulation (Pofahl, 
2006). Such merger simulation analysis commonly presumes, given that the analyst 
knows the parameters of the demand system and information is sufficiently 
comprehensive to calculate elasticities, it is possible to simulate the price effects or 
consumer welfare change of a merger. The soundness of this approach depends on how 
accurately the demand estimation reflects the reality and on how close the firm’s pricing 
behavior is to the assumed game (Ashenfelter and Hosken, 2008). However, in estimating 
the demand of differentiated-products markets (demand-side), there are thousands 
products to be taken into account. That is, it is common for several hundred brands to be 
sold in beer or breakfast cereal market (Pinkse and Slade, 2004).  
Traditional models used in demand estimation, as derived from constrained utility 
maximization, assume that quantity is a function of prices and income. These models 
such as Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) and Rotterdam demand model are 
characterized by “flexible functional forms” because they leave the own- and cross-price 
elasticities unrestricted to be determined by the data itself without imposing additional 
assumptions on substitution patterns like Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (Hausman, 1994). Nonetheless, if a demand equation involves the prices of all pertinent 
goods of differentiated products, estimation of all parameters will be a computational 
burden, which is what we call the curse of dimensionality (Pofahl, 2006). Arguably the 
direct solutions addressing the dimensionality problem are Distance Metric demand 
estimation method (DM) and discrete choice model (DC). 
However, one of DC’s obvious disadvantages is that multiple purchases by 
consumers cannot be studied. Discrete choice models are based on the assumption that 
each consumer buys only one product at each purchasing moment (Giacomo, 2004). 
Apparently, this assumption does not fit consumer behavior in many differentiated 
product markets, including Carbonated Soft Drinks (CSD). Dube (2004) showed, 
approximately, 31% of the shopping trips are multiple-product purchase of CSD and 
61.5% of the trips are multiple-unit purchase in his dataset. It is clear that presumption of 
single unit purchase is inappropriate in the CSD industry. 
On the other hand, Pinkse, Slade and Brett (2002) developed the distance metric (DM) 
estimation method to overcome the dimensionality limitation of classical demand models 
and the single purchase restriction of DC models by specifying the cross-price 
coefficients semi-parametrically, as functions of the distance between the products 
attribute space, projecting prices dimension into attributes dimension to reduced the 
number of estimated coefficients (Pofahl, 2006). For example, in the CSD industry, the 
distance metric  j i Carb Carb -  could be employed, which gives the absolute distance of 
the carbohydrate contents between i and j. 
In this essay, I incorporate the Distance Metric (DM) estimation approach in 
LA/AIDS model to assess the impacts of Cadbury/DPSU merger effective on March 2, 1995 in the U.S. CSD industry. The goal of this paper is to test the power of DM 
approach, as a basis for simulation study of merger analysis.  
Notably, dynamic aspects of demand are not incorporated in DM model. Since past 
purchases may play a more important role in the choice of durable goods than non 
durable goods, we should be able to ignore this issue in the CSD industry.  
2. The United States Carbonated Soft Drink Industry 
Soft Drink Production is the largest component of beverage manufacturing in the U.S., 
with annual 2006 revenue of $42.3 billion. This industry is dominated by carbonated soft 
drinks (CSD), which account for around 54.3% of industry revenue. The U.S. has very 
high levels of CSD consumption and per capita CSD consumption in the U.S. is 
estimated at 51.4 gallons per person per year.
 1 CSD refers to beverages manufactured by 
mixing flavoring concentrate, sweetener, and carbonated water. This industry has some of 
the highest brand recognition in the world along with a high level of sales through its vast 
investments in advertising and marketing. In 2006, Coca-Cola Company had 42.9 percent 
of the CSD market; Pepsi-Cola Company held a 31.2 percent share, and Cadbury 
Schweppes was ranked third, with 14.9 percent of the market share in 2006.
 2 
In January 1986, Philip Morris planned to sell the Seven-Up Company to PepsiCo, 
while Coca-Cola was attempting to buy Dr Pepper. However, both proposed acquisitions 
were blocked by Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for antitrust considerations. When 
these acquisitions were prohibited, Dallas-based investment bank Hicks& Haas 
purchased Dr Pepper for $406 million in August 1986. Britain’s Cadbury Schweppes also 
                                                 
1 Soft Drink Production in the US:31211. IBISWorld Industry Report. Online Edition. Available from 
http://www.ibisworld.com/industry/default.aspx?indid=284. Accessed October, 2008. 
2 Soft Drinks and Bottled Water. Encyclopedia of Global Industries. Online Edition. Gale, 2009. Available from 
http://galenet.galegroup.com. Accessed October, 2008. joined in the buyout, earning a minority stake in Dr. Pepper. Later in 1986, Hicks & Haas 
again purchased the U.S. operations of Seven-Up for $240 million. Next, Hicks & Haas 
merged Dr Pepper and Seven-Up, forming the Dr Pepper/Seven Up Companies, Inc. 
(DPSU) on May 19, 1988. Overall, DPSU’s share of the domestic soft drink market 
increased from 9.8 percent in 1991 to 11.4 percent in 1994.  
Cadbury, in October 1993, was further involved in the U.S. market through the 
acquisition of A&W Brands Inc. The addition of A&W Brands increased Cadbury’s 
share of the U.S. soft drink market to 5.6 percent. However, Cadbury expected to resist 
more aggregate competition from other international food and beverages companies, 
becoming the leading producer of noncola soft drinks in the world; apparently, the 
quickest way to achieving this goal was taking over DPSU in the U.S. market. On March 
2, 1995, Cadbury Schweppes acquired the rest of DPSU for $1.7 billion. The company 
becomes Dr Pepper/Cadbury of North America, Inc. This company currently has 
renamed as Dr Pepper Snapple Group. The new company had a market share of 17 
percent and a strong list of brands, including: Dr Pepper, 7 Up, Welch’s, IBC, Canada 
Dry, Schweppes, A&W, Crush, Sunkist, Squirt, Mott’s Hires, Sun Drop, Vernors, and 
Country Time.
 3 This made Cadbury Schweppes the largest non-cola soft drink company 
in America. The FTC did not oppose this acquisition, possibly expecting Cadbury to be 
more effective competitor of Coca-Cola and PepsiCo. Afterwards, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, 
and Cadbury together now account for about 90% of all CSDs sold in the U.S. (Saltzman, 
Levy and Hilke, 1999).
 4  
                                                 
3 Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc. Business & Company Resource Center. International Directory of Company Histories, Vol. 
32. St. James Press, 2000. Available from http://galenet.galegroup.com. Accessed November, 2008. 
 
4 Cadbury reportedly has “absolutely no ambitions or intentions as far as the cola business is concerned.” See Beverage 
Digest (Feb. 3, 1995 p3). Actually, a considerable portion of Cadbury’s CSDs are sold by Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola 3. Quantitative Methods for Merger Evaluation 
3.1 The Demand Model 
The first step of horizontal merger simulation is to estimate the demand for CSD at 
the brand-level. Pinkse and Slade (2004) derived the aggregate-demand function of 
product sales based on normalized-quadratic indirect-utility function as 
i i ij j i i
j
q a b p e y u = + - + ∑                           (i=1,…,n).                                 (3.1) 
where  ij B b   =   is an arbitrary n n ´  symmetric, negative-semidefinite matrix, and 
normalized prices  ( ) 1 2 , ,...,
T
n p p p p =  and aggregate income y have been divided by  0 p . 
Assume that both  i a  and the diagonal elements of B, which determine the own-price 
elasticities, are functions of the characteristics of product i,  ( ) i i a a x =  and  ( ) ii i b b x = . 
The off-diagonal elements of B are assumed to be functions of the distance between 
products in some set of metrics,  ( ),   i j ij ij b g d = ¹ . The function  ( ) . g  must be estimated 
semi-parametrically instead of imposing structure on that, showing how the distance 
measures,  ij d , influence the power of competition between products i and j.  ij d  measures 
the closeness of the two products, i and j, in attributes space. For example, if the products 
were brands of bottled juice, the measures of distances might be sodium content, market 
share proximity, or dummy variables that indicate whether commodities belong to the 
same manufacturer. The random variable  i u , which captures the influence of unobserved 
demand and cost variables, can be heteroskedastic and correlated across observations. 
                                                                                                                                                 
bottlers. In the late 1990s, Cadbury may be hesitant to compete with Coca-Cola and PepsiCo in the cola segment due to 
its all important relationship with their bottlers (Saltzman, Levy and Hilke, 1999). However, between 2006 and 2007, 
Cadbury Schweppes purchased the Dr Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Group (DPSUBG) and several other regional bottlers. 
This allowed DPS to bottle many of its own beverages but caused many Pepsi and Coke bottlers to drop Cadbury’s 
products. 
 Pinkse and Slade assume  i u  is mean independent of the observed characteristics, 
0 i E u x   =   . This is a strong independence assumption. If this assumption is violated, 
the estimator of the unknown parameter of equation (3.1) is inconsistent. 
One can apply the DM approach to the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand 
System Model (LA/AIDS). The substantial advantages of this model are that it can 
accommodate the non-linear aggregation across consumers and set no restrictions on the 
length of the panel data. As what we indicated previously, Pinkse and Slade’s individual 
indirect-utility function is of Gorman polar form. Although it can be easily aggregated or 
differentiated to obtain brand-level demands, the problematic assumptions are that the 
change in an individual’s demand for certain commodity with respect to a difference in 
personal income does not depend on earnings; this condition is the same for every 
consumer regardless of the individual’s character. As a result, if a consumer does not buy 
a product, then the income effect for that product is assumed to be zero. Thus, it amounts 
to suppose that income effect for all products is zero since it would be simple to find one 
person who does not purchase a certain commodity, especially with long length time 
periods in a dataset (Rojas, 2005). 
The LA/AIDS Model 
Formally, let i ( ) N ,..., 1 Î  be the index of products, t ( ) T ,..., 1 Î  the set of markets 
which are defined as cluster-week pairs
5 in this essay,  ( ) Nt t t p p p ,..., 1 =  the vector of 
retail prices in market t,  ( ) Nt t t q q q ,..., 1 =  the vector of quantities demanded, and 
                                                 
5 The cross-price elasticities are zero through markets. ∑ =
i it it t q p X  total expenditures in market t. Using these notations, the LA/AIDS 
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=  is the expenditure share for product i in market t, and the Stone price 
index is defined as follows: 







it it t p w P                                                                                    (3.3) 
It was typical to use Stone price index to linearize the AIDS model. However, 
Moschini (1995) indicated that Stone index, varies with the variation in units of 
measurement of prices and quantities. For example, suppose we change the unit of the 
first good from bales to tons, then the corresponding price will be scaled by 4 (1 ton = 4 
bales). Since such alternation does not impact the expenditure shares, the Stone index 
would apply unchanged weights to the scaled prices. This problem makes  ij g  or  i b  
generally biased. Among possible solutions suggested by Moschini, one feasible choice is 
( ) ln
L
t P  which is a loglinear analogue of the Laspeyres index, defined as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ), ln ln ln
0 * ∑ = »
i it i
L
t t p w P P                                                                  (3.4) 
where 
0
i w  is product i’s ‘base’ share, defined as  ∑
- º
t it i w T w
1 0 , the average 
expenditure share of product i over t. 
After replacing (3.3) by (3.4), the sales share form of LA/AIDS can be written as 
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                                                (3.5) Normally, the (N-1) equations of (3.5) can be estimated by Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) method. Nevertheless, if we apply LA/AIDS model to assess the 
demand of numerous CSD products here, the procedure has a significantly challenge in 
its evaluation due to the curse of dimensionality. 
Distance Metric (DM) Approach 
Following Pinkse and Slade (2004) as well as Rojas (2005), we propose characteristic 
distance metrics are added to the LA/AIDS model to alleviate the difficulty of estimation. 
Briefly speaking, our objective function, (3.5), includes a vector, d, which is the distance 
measure of product’s attributes, and the cross-price coefficients,  ij g ,  j i ¹ , can be 
prescribed as a function  () . g  of the distance measures,  ij d . 
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 + + + = ∑
¹
ln ln ; ln ,                   (3.6) 
where k equals the number of distance measures, and l  is the corresponding 
coefficients to each distance metric (Pofahl, 2006). The element of d is determined by 
researcher. Inwardly, the function g shows how difference of attributes affects the 
strength of product’s competition (Pinkse, Slade and Brett, 2002).  
The own-price parameter  ii g  is comprised of a constant and product i's attributes. 
Suppose carbohydrate content is a relevant attribute that has impact on the demand of 
CSD,  ii g  can be written as  i ii Carb 1 0 g g g + =  and 
hence ( ) ( ) ( ) i it it it ii Carb p p p ln ln ln 1 0 g g g + = , including a price interacting term with the 
product characteristics. 
Moreover, the intercept term  it a  is modified to contain demographic variables 
( Mt t Z Z ,..., 1 ) of each cluster. Besides, since advertising has noticeable effect on the growth of CSD consumption, even if we lack data for the expenditure on classical 
advertising channels like television, press and on-line advertisement, DFF has variable, 
sales, pointing out whether the product was sold on a promotion that week. Therefore, the 
percentage of stores on sales for specific brand within the same cluster ( it S ) can be a part 
of intercept. Given above assumptions,  it a  takes the form 
∑
=
+ + + =
M
m
it m i mt im i it S c Z c
1
1 , 0 a a                                                                     (3.7) 
Then, the LA/AIDS model with DM method becomes 
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0 b    for linear homogeneity.                                (3.9b) 
To have more clear insight of DM method, let’s make a simple example below. 
Suppose there are four commodities sold in the market, the traditional AIDS demand 
system is like: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln ln
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ln ln ln ln ln
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 + + + + + =
 If we impose symmetry on the cross-price parameters, six cross-price parameters need to 
be estimated. Suppose carbohydrates and sodium contents are the relevant product 
characteristics that have influence on the demand of CSD and let 
carb
ij d  and 
so
ij d symbolize the distance measures of carbohydrates as well as sodium content between 





ij d d 2 1 0 l l l + + . Given there are no brand attributes terms in the own-price 
parameter, the whole system after substitution becomes  
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Moreover, the demand system can be written as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
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(3.10) 
For cross-price coefficients, only three parameters,  0 l ,  1 l  and  2 l  are necessary to be 
estimated right now. Obviously, if there are numerous products are involved in the 
demand estimation, the method’s effect on reducing the dimensionality will be clearer. 
This is why we say DM method can handle the challenge for “curse of dimensionality”. 
6 
Because the distance metrics are symmetric, symmetry can be required by making l  
equal across all equations. Once we obtain the estimated coefficients of l , it is simple to 
calculate the cross-price coefficients and elasticities. The functional form of  () . g  can be 
estimated by parametric or semiparametric methods. If the parametric assumption is 
correct, then choosing the semi-parametric methods will be inefficient. However, we 
estimate  () . g  semi-parametrically since it can derive as much flexibility in the pattern of 
substitution as possible without depend on any arbitrary parametric form according to the 
analyst’s uncertain knowledge or beliefs. Among numerous semi-parametric estimation 
                                                 
6 This example was suggested by Dr. Pofahl. approaches, we attempt to apply additive model with B-splines in continuous metrics to 
get the optimal function form of  () . g . 
Additionally, the expression of Marshallian price elasticities, uncompensated price 
elasticities, can be written as (Green and Alston, 1990 and Rojas, 2005) 
[ ]

























    j i for    ,    ;
1





        


































b l b l
b g b g
h          (3.11) 
3.2 Household Demographics 
In addition to demand parameter estimation, capturing variation in substitution 
patterns among across broad classifications of consumer groups should not be ignored in 
our estimation. Based on the same data resource, Hoch et al. (1995) and Chintagunta et al. 
(2003) indicate category-level consumer price elasticity across stores is mainly 
influenced by consumer demographic difference. In other words, zone-pricing through 
store chain is substantially activated by price discrimination on consumer’s heterogeneity 
rather than competition between stores. Thus, consumer demographic difference between 
clusters will be considered as we estimate the demand of CSD. 
4. Data and Preliminary Data Analysis 
4.1 Demand Data 
The primary data resource is the administrative Dominick Database from Kilt Center 
for Marketing, University of Chicago, Booth School of Business. The dataset involves 
weekly retail price, sold quantities, and profits for more than 3500 UPCs for over 100 
stores operated by Dominick’s Finer Foods (DFF) across approximately 9 years 
(09/14/89-05/14/97). DFF is the second-largest supermarket operator in the metropolitan Chicago area. Safeway, which bought Dominick’s in 1998, has decided to keep the chain, 
which was offered for sale in the early 2000s, but failed to attract a buyer. I select the 
products related to the Cadbury/DPSU merger from the “Soft Drink” (SDR) group.  
Data Preparation 
Observations were dropped if one of these variables including sold quantity, price, or 
profit, was missing for that observation. This essay covers the store-level scanner data for 
2 years from 03/04/1993 to 03/05/1997. I segregate the data into two groups depending 
on the effective date of Cadbury/DPSU merger on March 2, 1995 as a dividing point. The 
nearest two years of pre-merger data which starts from 03/04/1993 to 03/01/1995, 
equivalent to recorded week #182-#285 in DFF database, is employed to simulate the 
price effects of this CSD merger, while the post-merger data is used to be a comparison 
with the simulated price changes. Nevertheless, given a lack of available price 
information for three brands on the selected list in week #211, we drop the observations 
during this period. After we decide the selected brands, if a certain brand does not have 
sales information in some markets during the period of interest, the whole selected brands 
observations are deleted in that cluster-week pair to avoid bias in estimation. Finally, 
5,616 observations are taken into considerations in the analysis. 
The information on nutritional facts is based on previous research, as well as 
collected from CSD package at local supermarkets or manufacturer websites. If the 
collected information from grocery stores is different from Dube (2005)
 7  and 
McMillan’s paper (2007), we will pick up the data from their search rather than 
information on package since some brands may have been re-formulated. For example, 7-
                                                 
7 The first version of Dube’s paper (2004) was received on September 25, 2000 by Marketing Science. The products’ 
characteristics table in that paper is the earliest data I can find for this merger case happened in 1995. UP has replaced sodium citrate with potassium citrate to reduce the beverage's sodium 
content in 2006. 
8 For some commodities which are unavailable through their inquiries, 
unless we are very sure some brands’ formula was altered after 1995, we presume that the 
nutrition facts on current brands are consistent with the characteristic content during the 
related period of our research. Another difficulty faced in this research is that the element 
of CSD is viewed as a business secret; consumer service employees of these companies 
refused to offer information about ingredients. Initially, different package sizes of 
specific brand are viewed as different products because of the differences in storability. 
Also, Dube’s research outcome (2005) shows that package size is a relevant attribute 
affecting consumer’s purchase behavior. However, results of our preliminary OLS 
regressions before aggregation indicates most attributes related to package size are 
insignificant in the demand estimation despite the metrics form of size. 
9 Besides, most 
papers applying DM method as Rojas’ work in brewing industry and Pofahl’s job in 
bottled juice category mainly focus on brand-level demand. Thus, we do the aggregate of 
CSD products into sixteen brands and that should be helpful to simply the demand 
estimation effectively.   
DFF clusters its stores into four groups: A, B, C and D. I form the stores within the 
same cluster as the same cohort and handle these groups as separate regional markets. 
The demographics description and summary of statistics for each cluster of store-specific 
demographic data are shown in Table1 and Table2. The data are obtained from US 
Government (1990) census data for the Chicago metropolitan area and Market Metrics 
                                                 
8 See http://www.solarnavigator.net/solar_cola/7up.htm. 
9 Preliminary OLS outcomes are shown in Table A1 and A2 in Appendix A. The t-statistic of package size (Mvol) is -0.90 
in Table A1 where the package size is used to set continuous metrics while the t-statistic of package size (Msize) is 2.09 
in Table A2 where package size is treated as a dummy indicator. Both of them are insignificant at 5% level.   operates this data to generate demographic profiles for each of the DFF stores.
 10 
Although it has been documented that Dominick’s price zones are up to 16 for the whole 
Chicago area, for simplicity, here I assume there are only four price zones.  
To further simply the analysis, CSDs with at least a 0.3% sales volume share (in fluid 
ounces)
 11 in any cluster are taken into account, consisting of 16 brands including the top-
10 soft drinks brands in 1994-1995 and some Cadbury’s famous brands representing 
approximately 68.3% share of total CSD sales by dollar value during the relevant time 
period. 
12 Chosen brands and their market shares as well as their characteristics are shown 
in Table 3 and Table 4. Coke is the most expansive while Diet A&W Root Beer is the 
least expensive. I do not consider regional brands here because of the comparably small 
nationwide sales percentage, about 3%. Additionally, we only have data throughout 
Chicago metropolitan region.  
4.2 Distance Metrics 
The brand attributes that are presumed to affect consumer’s perception are comprised 
of: calories, milligrams of sodium, and grams of total carbohydrates content based on per 
12 fluid ounce (355 ml) serving, as well as a set of binary variables for the presence of 
caffeine, citric acid and whether it is a cola drink. Dummy variables are constructed to 
identify different manufacturers. These chosen characteristics are established based on 
earlier work of Dube (2004 and 2005) and McMillan (2007). Noticeably, it is clear that 
there is high correlation between calories and carbohydrates and therefore we only 
choose carbohydrates, sparing calories, in setting distance matrices.   
                                                 
10 See http://research.chicagogsb.edu/marketing/databases/dominicks/demo.aspx for more detail of DFF Store-Specific 
Demographics database. 
11 In highly competitive differentiated industry, a new product with 0.5% market share can be considered quite 
successful (Cotterill, 1999). 
12 The ranking of top-10 best selling brands has a slight change in 1994-1995 but the list of brand for 1994 and 1995 
are the same. Database: Business Source Complete.  Coverage, the percentage of stores that sell specific brand, is utilized as a choice of 
continuous variable in both Pinske and Slade’s (2004) as well as Rojas’s (2005) research. 
We do not consider it here since almost all of the selected CSDs are sold at every chain 
store over the interested time period that makes coverage useless here. 
Discrete and continuous matrices are set as an inverse of distance to make the 
interpretation of result easier.  
Continuous Distance Measures with Continuous Brand Attributes 
I create single-dimension distance metrics of carbohydrate content of CSD in 
continuous attribute space as: 










                                                         (4.1) 
where  j i Carb Carb -  is the absolute value for the difference of brand’s rescaled-
carbohydrates content and  ( ] 1 , 0 Î
k
ij d . If brands i and j have the same carbohydrates 
attributes, this metric reaches the maximized value of 1. As the distance in carbohydrates 
space between brands i and j grows, the metric’s value approaches to zero. Obviously, the 
assumption behind this formula is that the strength of the competition is influenced by 
how near the brand’s attributes are. That is to say that we use this measure to examine if 
Diet Pepsi is a stronger substitution for Diet Coke than Coke. The measures of the other 
continuous characteristics, such as sodium as well as carbohydrates coverage are 
constructed following the same formula. The above one-dimensional metrics are not 
singular option for making distance measure; that is we can define an n-dimensional 
Euclidian distance measure to accommodate multiple attributes between different brands. 
For instance, a two-dimensional distance metrics can be written as: ( ) ( )
2 2 2 1
1
j i j i
SCB
ij
Carb Carb So So
d
- + - +
=                                          (4.2) 
However, if we want to know which characteristic plays the most influential role in 
determining patterns of substitution, a single-dimensional metrics cannot be neglected 
(Pofahl, 2006). 
Discrete Distance Measures with Continuous Brands Attributes 
Following Pinkse and Slade (2004), Rojas (2005) as well as Pofahl (2006), 
continuous commodities attributes can be used to construct two-dimensional market areas 
and these measures are derived from the Euclidean distance. Two kinds of metrics are 
considered here: the nearest-neighbor measures and the common-boundary measures.  
For nearest-neighbor metrics, the distance measure in sodium/carbohydrates space 
can be defined exogenously that 
NNSC
ij d  equals to one when brands i as well as j are 
nearest neighbors to each other in sodium/carbohydrates space,  2
1  if brands i(j) is j’s(i's) 
nearest neighbor but not vice versa, and 0 otherwise. Brand i’s nearest neighbor is meant 
to be the brand having the shortest Euclidean distance from brand i in relevant attribute 
space. To derive more reasonable and reliable Euclidean distance between brands, 
continuous attributes are rescaled through dividing by its maximum value since each of 
these characteristics’ measurement unit differs so it is better to limit the value of 
continuous characteristics between 0 and 1.  
Moreover, for common-boundary metrics, 
CBSC
ij d  is set to be one when brands i and j 
share a common boundary in brand’s sodium/carbohydrates space but are not nearest 
neighbors, and zero otherwise. In detail, given the coordinates of i and j as ( ) carb so i i ,  and ( ) carb so j j ,  in sodium/carbohydrates space, then a common boundary of i and j is defined 
as a set of variables ( ) Carb Sodium,  satisfying the next equation: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2
carb so carb so j Carb j So i Carb i So - + - = - + -                                (4.3)                                
After solving (4.3), a linear relation between So and Carb is that: 
( ) so so















2 2 2 2
                                               (4.4) 
Once above equation for all i and j are solved, the intersection points of the lines derived 
from linear equation will be determined and necessarily establish which portion of the 
lines are actual common boundaries (Rojas, 2005). 
Additionally, another set of nearest-neighbor is developed by considering brand 
attributes and per fluid ounce price together. It allows a situation that consumer’s 
purchase decision depends on both brands’ attributes as well as the relative prices 
between competitors simultaneously (Rojas, 2005). Following Rojas, nearest-neighbor 
metrics is set upon the summation of square for the attributes’ Euclidean distance and 
differential in average unit (fl.oz.) price. That is, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) j carb so i carb so p j Carb j So p i Carb i So + - + - = + - + -
2 2 2 2                      (4.5) 
Discrete Distance Measures with Discrete Brand Attributes 
Here, some categories distance measures are included. Although there is no distinct 
definition on classification of CSDs, according to the nutrition information for each 
product, the selected commodities are classified to noncola-caffeine free, noncola-
caffeine, cola-caffeine free and cola-caffeine segment. In other words,  
seg
ij d  is equal to 
one if brands i as well as j are in the same segment and zero otherwise. Besides, we have dummy variable indicating if the drinks have ingredient of citric 
acid and thus 
citric
ij d  is set to be one if brands i as well as j both contain citric acid and 
zero otherwise. 
These products are manufactured by Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and Cadbury respectively 
so a discrete distance metric for manufacturer identity is created to examine if shoppers 
tend to substitute between brands with the same manufacturer when price change occurs. 
Hence, 
manu
ij d ’s value is one when brands i, as well as j, belong to the same manufacturer 
and zero otherwise. 
All weighting matrices regarding brand classification can be normalized; the sum of 
each row is equivalent to one and thus the weighted prices of rival commodities which 
are in the same group will be equal to their mean (Rojas, 2005). 
5. Econometric Estimation 
Price Endogeneity 
Dhar, Chavas and Gould (2003) shows AIDS model with retail level scanner data for 
differentiated products has price endogeneity, likely coming from retailer’s pricing 
strategy or consumer heterogeneity, and that will cause inconsistent demand estimates as 
well as have large impact on price and expenditure elasticities. Moreover, Pinkse, Slade 
and Brett (2002) indicates, obviously, the instrumented variables in our case are of the 




ij p d g ln ;l  and thus it is intuitive to choose instruments of the form 




ij y d g l ;  where  jht y  is correlated to  jt p  but uncorrelated to  it e . If  jht y  can 








ij p d g ln ;l .  
An appropriate instrument is necessary for this study. The advantage of this database 
is that we are able to compute the real wholesale prices from gross margin that Dominick 
offers on the website. Following Pofahl (2006), the calculated wholesale prices are 
utilized as instruments for retail prices, as well as rescaled by Chicago Metropolitan’s 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). I compute the 
share of total sold volume for every brand in each market and then apply these as weights 
to get the weighted average per fluid ounce price (wholesale and retail). 
6. Estimated Results 
Before investigate the semi-parametric estimations, even though OLS (or IV) 
estimated coefficients are probably inconsistent, they are still meaningful. 
13 
Preliminary OLS Regression Result before Aggregation 
Prior to doing an aggregate of products by their brands, we have 16,121 observations, 
consisting of 47 products. Table (A.1) and (A.2) shows the estimated coefficients and t-
statistics results of each distance measure when package size is treated as continuous 
metric and discrete metric, respectively. Regardless of the form of container size metrics, 
the OLS preliminary results indicate own-price coefficients are both negative and 
statistically significant even at 1% level. 
14 We do not check the loyalty to a given 
product because we cannot trace specific consumer’s shopping history and thus we are 
not able to build relevant metric for this item. On the other hand, we set a brand identity, 
                                                 
13 IV estimators may be inconsistent if presumed g function is wrong. In other words, only given right distance 
measures, IV estimator just could be consistent. 
 
14 . The t-statistic of own-price coefficient is -43.88 when the package size is used to set continuous metrics and -44.16 
when package size is treated as a dummy indicator.   
 brand
ij d  to check if consumers are apt to choose a certain brand. As expected, the positive 
coefficient on brand identity shows that consumer has loyalty to specific product. In 
addition, both cases imply product’s promotion has positive effect on purchasing 
behavior. 
15 The estimated result of manufacturer implies consumers may not support 
particular firm. That is a Coke lover may not prefer Sprite to Seven-Up. The negative 
sign of coefficient on group segment represents a product within the same group is 
stronger substitute than another group’s product; the competition between products with 
the same category is more aggressive. The comparison between our estimation result and 
Dube’s result (2004 and 2005) is shown in Table A.3.  
Preliminary OLS Regression Result after Aggregation 
Results of our preliminary OLS regressions before aggregation indicates package size 
is not an obviously relevant attribute affecting the purchasing decision.
16 Consequently, 
we do the aggregate of CSD products based on their brands. 
Estimation results are reported in Table 5. Most distance metrics have similar effects 
as the previous analysis on non-aggregated products. For example, sales activity can 
stimulate consumer to purchase and also brands within the same category have stronger 
substitution than other groups. Besides, the nearest neighbor measure with price has 
stronger effect than its counterparts. 
  7. Conclusions 
In this study we have considered the performance of distance-metrics method applied 
in demand estimation of carbonated soft drink products. Based on preliminary OLS 
                                                 
15 The t-statistic of sales coefficient is 4.02 when the package size is used to set continuous metrics and 4.00 when 
package size is treated as a dummy indicator.   
 
16 The t-statistic of can size indicator (Msize) is 1.83 which is insignificant under 95% confidence level.   
 outcome, the estimated coefficients are satisfied our prior expectations and results are 
consistent with previous research. Brand loyalty and stronger substitution between 
products of the same group is found in our study, as also found in Rojas and others. Our 
tentative conclusion is that distance metrics approach is worthy of further consideration 




Table 1: General Traits of Typical Household in Demographic Cluster in DFF Database 
   Cluster 










Household Size  Medium  Small  Medium  Large 
Married  Married (50% 
w/ children)  Few married  Married  Nuclear 
Families 
Children  Older (6-17)  Few  Few  Many 
Singles  Few  Lots  Few  Few 
Education  High (36% 
college+) 
Medium (30% 
college +)  Low education  High (35% 
college+) 
Seniors  Some  Some  Many  Few 
Middle Age  Lots  Few  Lots  Few 
Dual Income  Lots  Few  Few  Many 








Price Zone  Moderate 
competition 
Low 
competition  Moderate  Very 
competitive 




   
 Notes: We thank William Minseuk Cha., research assistant of James M. Kilts Center for Marketing, 
offering this table to us. 
 
 
* Nuclear Family primarily refers a family group is comprised of most naturally, a father, 
a mother and their kids. 
 Table 2: Mean and Standard Deviation of Demographics for Store Cluster in DFF Database 
      Cluster 
Variable  Description  A  B  C  D 
















































































Source: DFF database, James M. Kilts Center, University of Chicago Booth School of Business. 
 Table 3. List of Brands with Aggregate Sales Volume Shares, Average Retail Price and Their 







Cluster A  Cluster B  Cluster C  Cluster D  Total 
Pepsi  0.0258  0.20864  0.26787  0.31697  0.24004  0.25508 
Coke  0.027  0.15242  0.15351  0.12945  0.14540  0.14415 
Diet Pepsi  0.0242  0.12888  0.10359  0.11892  0.13231  0.12430 
Diet Coke  0.0251  0.13413  0.09234  0.08065  0.12005  0.11012 
7 UP  0.0256  0.09030  0.13633  0.12736  0.08339  0.10334 
Diet 7 UP  0.0254  0.03878  0.03464  0.03669  0.03467  0.03631 
Diet Caffeine Free 
Pepsi  0.0257  0.03969  0.02129  0.02717  0.04124  0.03466 
Dr Pepper  0.0254  0.03289  0.02446  0.03140  0.03876  0.03347 
Sprite  0.0252  0.03227  0.03774  0.03108  0.03032  0.03197 
Diet Caffeine Free 
Coke  0.0267  0.03948  0.01902  0.01569  0.03418  0.02890 
Mountain Dew Soda  0.0256  0.02164  0.01962  0.01805  0.02592  0.02192 
Canada Dry Ginger Ale  0.0195  0.02043  0.03315  0.02001  0.01803  0.02108 
A&W Root Beer  0.0225  0.01090  0.00981  0.01036  0.01144  0.01081 
Squirt Soda  0.026  0.00436  0.00596  0.00459  0.00424  0.00458 
Diet A&W Root Beer  0.0144  0.00464  0.00352  0.00344  0.00396  0.00396 
A&W Cream Soda  0.0214  0.00369  0.00123  0.00331  0.00382  0.00333 
 Table 4: Attributes of CSD Brands in the Dataset 
 
Manufacturer  Product  Calories  Sodium (mg)  Carbohydrates 
(g)  Caffeine  Contain Citric 
Acid   Cola 
Coke  140  50  39  1  0  1 
Diet Coke  0  40  0  1  1  1 
Diet Caffeine Free Coke  0  40  0  0  1  1 
Coca Cola 
Sprite  140  70  38  0  1  0 
Pepsi  150  35  41  1  1  1 
Diet Pepsi  0  35  0  1  1  1 
Diet Caffeine Free Pepsi  0  35  0  0  1  1 
PepsiCo 
Mountain Dew Soda  170  70  46  1  1  0 
Dr Pepper  150  55  40  1  0  0 
7 UP  140  75  39  0  1  0 
Diet 7 UP  0  35  0  0  1  0 
Canada Dry Ginger Ale  140  50  36  0  1  0 
A&W Root Beer  170  65  47  0  0  0 
Diet A&W Root Beer  0  100  0  0  0  0 
A&W Cream Soda  190  70  47  1  1  0 
Cadbury 
Squirt Soda  140  50  39  0  1  0 
Characteristics are per 12-oz serving.  
 
Data Source:1.https://www.wegmans.com/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/HomepageView?storeId=10052&catalogId=10002&langId=-1 










 Table 5: OLS regression results of Estimated Coefficient on Distance Metrics before aggregation 
(Metrics of Manufacturer is not included) 
 
Distance Metrics              Cross-Price 
Continuous Distance Measures with Continuous Variables  Coeff  t-stat. 
One-Dimensional                   
 
Carbohydrate Content 
(Mcarb)      11.85*  4.28 
   Sodium Content (Mso)        -27.52*  -7.00 
Two-Dimensional                   
  
Sodium/Carbohydrate Content 
(MSC)     11.23  1.53 
Discrete Distance Measures with Continuous Variables       
Nearest Neighbor                   
 
Sodium/Carbohydrate Content 
(MNNSC)    -7.74  -1.15 
   Sodium/Carbohydrate/Price Content (MNNSCP)  24.58*  4.18 
Common 
Boundaries                   
 
Sodium/Carbohydrates Content 
(MCBSC)    -28.35*  -12.49 
Discrete Distance Measures with Discrete Variables          
Product Classifications                
  Product grouping (Mgroup)      -46.38*  -5.48 
   Citric Acid Containing (Mcitric)        6.54  0.43 
 
1. All regressions include cluster, product, and year dummy indicators. 
2. Coefficients have been multiplied by 1,000 for readability 
3. * Significant at 1%    
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Table A.1: OLS Regression Results of Estimated Coefficient on Distance Metrics before 
Aggregation (Package size is treated as a continuous variable) 
 
Distance Metrics          Cross-Price 
Continuous Distance Measures with Continuous Variables  Coeff  t-stat. 
One-Dimensional                   
  Carbohydrate Content (Mcarb)      -2.68*  -2.85 
  Sodium Content (Mso)      0.41  0.38 
  Container Volume (Mvol)      -0.34  -0.90 
Two-Dimensional                   
  Sodium/Carbohydrate Content (MSC)    31.84*  6.45 
  Sodium/Volume Content (MSV)      -23.98*  -16.05 
  Carbohydrate/Volume Content (MCV)    19.20*  13.48 
Discrete Distance Measures with Continuous Variables          
Nearest Neighbor                   
  Sodium/Carbohydrate Content (MNNSC)    -26.86*  -5.74 
  Sodium/Carbohydrate Content with Price (MNNSCP)  7.41*  4.07 
   Sodium/Carbohydrate/Volume Content (MNNSCV)  -2.09  -1.2 
Common 
Boundaries                   
  Sodium/Carbohydrate Content (MCBSC)    2.09**  2.54 
  Carbohydrates/Volume Content (MCBCV)    1.4  1.74 
Discrete Distance Measures with Discrete Variables          
Product Classifications                
  Manufacturer Identity (Mmanu)      4.35  0.55 
  Brand Identity (Mbrand)      28.24*  4.08 
  Product grouping (Mgroup)      -51.07*  -5.93 
   Citric Acid Containing (Mcitric)        15.53  0.98 
   
1. All regressions include cluster, product, and year dummy indicators. 
2. Coefficients have been multiplied by 1,000 for readability 
3. * Significant at 1% , ** Significant at 5%     
Table A.2: OLS Regression Results of Estimated Coefficient on Distance Metrics before 
Aggregation (Package size is treated as a dummy variable) 
 
Distance Metrics          Cross-Price 
Continuous Distance Measures with Continuous Variables  Coeff  t-stat. 
One-Dimensional                   
  Carbohydrate Content (Mcarb)      2.83*  3.30 
  Sodium Content (Mso)      -5.75*  -5.64 
Two-Dimensional                   
  Sodium/Carbohydrate Content (MSC)    20.73*  4.27 
Discrete Distance Measures with Continuous Variables       
Nearest Neighbor                   
 
Sodium/Carbohydrate Content 
(MNNSC)    -16.32*  -3.58 
   Sodium/Carbohydrate/Price Content (MNNSCP)  9.25*  5.17 
Common 
Boundaries                   
  Sodium/Carbohydrates Content (MCBSC)   4.79*  4.55 
Discrete Distance Measures with Discrete Variables          
Product Classifications                
 
Manufacturer Identity 
(Mmanu)      11.34  1.42 
  Brand Identity (Mbrand)      29.78*  4.36 
  Product grouping (Mgroup)      -54.17*  -6.21 
  Size classification (Msize)      5.37  1.83 
   Citric Acid Containing (Mcitric)        -2.96  -0.19 
 
1. All regressions include cluster, product, and year dummy indicators. 
2. Coefficients have been multiplied by 1,000 for readability 
3.* Significant at 1% Table A.3: The comparison between our estimation results before aggregation and 
Dube’s result 
 
   Our result  Dube's result 
Variables and Distance Measures  sign  significant  sign  significant 
On Promotion  positive  yes  positive  yes 
Brand Loyalty  positive  yes  positive  yes 
Product Loyalty  unknown  unknown  positive  no 
Manufacturer Loyalty  positive  no  unknown  unknown 
Package Size  either  no  positive  yes 
 
*Dube’s result is based on his papers published in 2004 and 2005. 
 